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…the actual and present condition of Africa [Somalia] is one of deep 
trouble, sometimes a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during 
the colonial years.
Basil Davidson, The Blackman’s Burden, Time Books, 1992, p. 9.
Tell him that we do not wish for greediness
We do not wish that his ears should be hard of hearing
We do not wish that he should act arbitrarily…
R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, 
Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 82.
I. Introduction
Let’s begin with one fundamental assertion: We both feel deeply for 
Somalia and its people—our people. In the heat of this moment, some 
might dismiss such a sentiment as rather anachronistic. But even if 
there is some grain of truth to that judgment, we hold firmly that the 
instinct is a viable and deliberate mistiming commensurate with the 
imperatives of the long durée. Our loyalty, therefore, is to no individual 
or political group. On the contrary, we define ourselves as civic scholars 
whose sole interest is to make whatever small contribution our modest 
talents will allow to the revival of Somali national identity, dignity, and 
purpose. This brief essay’s central concern, then, is the direction of the 
country in the wake of the recent announcements of a new leadership 
and political institutions. We offer these thoughts, though somewhat 
melancholic in word and tone, with the hope that our compatriots will 
use the new tidings as a potentially valuable development (albeit not 
a tabula rasa as one would have wished for); that is, a fleeting opportu-
nity to be used to move out of the current morass and positively forge 
ahead towards an authentic renewal.
The essay is based on two temporalities: the bulk was written in the 
immediate wake of the announcement of the new dispensation from 
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Nairobi last autumn; part two, starting with the update, was authored 
in early August 2005.
Somalia has been the only independent country without a national 
government in modern times.1 Haunting images of warlords condemn-
ing multitudes of hapless people to artificial famine moved the United 
States and the United Nations to intervene in 1992. Although the huge 
military intervention was successful in saving hundreds of thousands 
of Somalis from starvation, that effort failed to help the country recon-
stitute a national government. The chaos that ensued led to the depar-
ture of the international force. Subsequently, Somalia dropped off the 
watch of the world, despite worsening human conditions throughout 
the country. It is only after September 11 that it has regained some 
attention, particularly from the United States—a concern that pivots 
on preventing possible terrorists from finding a safe haven in the area. 
The United States closely monitors the country despite the fact that the 
original suspicion that Al-Qaida members were in the country had not 
materialized.
For almost a decade, the only international commitment to help the 
Somali people has been limited to meager humanitarian aid. It is only 
in the last two years that the world community, led by the European 
Union (EU), tried to aid Somalia’s so-called peace and reconciliation 
process. Earlier, nearly a dozen attempts at peace had failed to produce 
a national government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Devel-
opment (IGAD), a regional organization whose members consist of 
Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda, spear-
headed the latest peace conference, which lasted for two years (starting 
October 2002). Unfortunately, incompetence, malfeasance, and the con-
flicting self-interest of some IGAD countries as well as officials of the 
Conference itself practically ensured that warlords (the main culprits 
responsible for the suffering of the Somali people) and corrupt poli-
ticians and their mainly illiterate clients dominated the process and 
appointed members of the Transitional Parliament and cabinet minis-
ters. Simultaneously, civic groups, individuals, and professionals who 
did not partake in the destruction of the country and who invested 
heavily in peacemaking and reconstruction have been systematically 
excluded. Certain members of the IGAD, particularly Ethiopia and 
others who supported the process, have acted as unabashed partisans 
rather than honest facilitators and mediators.2 Regrettably, they used 
their authority to undermine the integrity of the process. On their part, 
the civic groups and professionals also failed to organize and mount a 
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challenge to the modalities of the peace conference and the fate of their 
country.
II. IGAD: A Failure and the Need for a Somali Social Contract
The outcome of the IGAD approach to Somali peace has been to empower 
the warlords and enfeeble the rest. Consequently, warlords maneuvered 
the selection of members of the new Parliament, including appointing 
many from among their retinues. Most MPs, however, were not neces-
sarily beholden or accountable to anyone and were ready to offer their 
votes to the highest bidder.3 Only a few of the MPs have respected 
their solemn oath to uphold the Draft Charter. As one keen Swedish 
diplomatic observer of the peace process noted a few months earlier, 
“Somalia will have a government of warlords and a parliament most of 
whose members are illiterate.” That prognosis has begun to unfold.
On October 10, 2004, the Transitional Parliament selected Colonel 
Abdillahi Yusuf as President from a roster of candidates. Col. Yusuf’s 
ascendance might not bode well for the future of the transition, given 
his record as a leader of the Northeast region (Puntland) and as a client 
of Ethiopia since the late 1970s. Although Mr. Yusuf had earned a great 
deal of credit for courageously standing up to Siyaad Barre’s dictator-
ship, he has a long and disturbing history in Somalia and in his home 
region, where he acted as a ruler. For instance, he is known to have 
made a mockery of political ethics, betrayed an appetite for cruel arbi-
trariness, and ran a maladroit administration. After the collapse of the 
Siyaad Barre regime, the Northeast region of Somalia made impressive 
progress to restore peace and take tentative measures to create a demo-
cratic regional order. These advances were reversed when Col. Yusuf 
came to power on July 23, 1998. The Council of Elders who appointed 
him removed him from office due to both a poor performance by his 
administration and the expiration of his tenure. He declined to accept 
the verdict and reclaimed power through force.4 Further, there are 
many allegations that he has intimidated opponents to such an extent 
that some fled the region, such as the former Chief Justice of the region 
of Puntland. Others are reported to have been eliminated.5 Col. Yusuf’s 
close alliance with Ethiopia was revealed by the surfacing of a video in 
2002 that showed him admitting to receiving support from Ethiopia in 
his attempt to retake power and consolidate his personal rule. He has 
also publicly articulated sectarian and clanistic ideas (e.g., a videotape 
captures Mr. Yusuf claiming that the town of Kismayo belongs to the 
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Harti kin group alone) that will not endear him to Somalis from other 
kin groups. In short, his record does not inspire confidence and, in fact, 
makes Somalia’s new transition worrisome.
III. What Now? Public Atonement and More
In spite of this dismaying background, there is a real opportunity to 
change course and begin a new chapter. Somalis and many in the 
international community are eager to witness the end of Somalia’s 
nightmare. But this yearning should not be an excuse to avoid taking 
stock of the illegitimacy of the Conference, the abysmal quality of most 
of the MPs and cabinet members, and the profile of the transitional 
leadership. The proceedings in Nairobi were neither about genuine 
power-sharing nor designed as a peace process. There is overwhelm-
ing evidence that it was ineptly organized and managed,6 and that the 
selections of delegates and, ultimately, members of the new Parliament 
and Cabinet were, at best, highly irregular. The daunting question, 
then, is this: Can such an inflated number of Parliamentarians (275) and 
Cabinet (over 90), and a President whose public record is blemished by clanist 
and harsh personal rule, effectively shepherd reconciliation, lawful authority, 
and national revival?
We pointed out, when the original version of this essay was written 
in October 2004, that most Somalis were willing to conditionally sup-
port a peace-making and reconstruction period under the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), despite the sinister machinations that pro-
duced the dispensation. We proffered a minimum of six major condi-
tions under which public support might jumpstart a new and worthy 
social contract:
•  Public atonement—that is, a clear admission of past grave misdeeds 
of the leaders, starting with the Transitional President and members 
of Parliament (Toobad keen and Cafis). Such a posture must include a 
request for forgiveness;7
•  A legally binding undertaking that the regime will manage the tran-
sitional process peacefully, democratically, transparently, and in 
observation of the law and protection of human rights;
•  Articulate a vision for the country that explains the great challenges 
of the present and then sets the direction and main particularities of 
the new time;
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•  Create a lean (no more than a dozen) cabinet and ambassadorial 
appointments of men and women who are highly qualified and 
competent;
•  Ensure that the National Commissions (i.e., reconciliation, constitu-
tion, civil service, etc.) be formed transparently and professionally, 
and are led by a nonpartisan group;
•  Formally and urgently make a request to the African Union (AU) 
for the immediate creation of a high-powered commission (South 
Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria) with a significant nonpartisan Somali 
membership to guide the peaceful reconciliation between the North-
west region (Somaliland) and the Transitional Federal Government.
The above might not be enough, but nothing short of these acts and 
promises will inspire wide public trust for the transition. To make cer-
tain that this new social contract is honored, the inception of a national 
watchdog group with international representation from the EU, U.S.A., 
AU, and U.N. that will monitor deviations from these principles is 
absolutely necessary. A clear signal of the character of the TFG, and par-
ticularly the thinking and vision of the Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed 
Geedi, is how and what type of senior administrators are selected.8 
One of the essential characteristics of the Siyaad regime was a nefari-
ous nepotism in the appointment of people to key positions in the gov-
ernment. Recent regional administrations and the defunct TNG had 
adopted that practice: many of the top people around the leaders of 
these operations are/were unqualified and clanistic hucksters or mere 
cronies. This has created a political culture in which primarily kin and 
sycophants are trusted and rewarded. Such privatization of civic space 
has deflated the people’s credence in public affairs and enervated col-
lective ownership of the commons. The first acid test of the new tran-
sitional federal leadership is whether they will bring on board a cadre 
of professionally skilled Somalis, who are neither related nor beholden 
to them, as top managers in the new administrative apparatuses of the 
state.
Would this transitional period begin to heal the deep wounds of the civil 
war and overcome the dictatorial legacy of the old regime and the nightmare 
of warlord tyranny, given the dearth of skilled and committed people in the 
Parliament and government leadership? The old pattern of failure can be 
circumvented only if at least five factors are tightly interwoven:
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•  First, the new leaders commit themselves to the aforementioned 
principles of the new social contract.
•  Second, given the transitional regime’s desperate need for material 
support, the international community, particularly the EU, which 
has been the main supporter of the Conference in Nairobi, must 
play a decisive role to ensure that the militias are fully disarmed 
and a professional and effective police force is established. In addi-
tion, the expected bankers of the transition must also demand that 
civic groups and professionals play a strategic role in re-establishing 
major public institutions. These two acts would trigger confidence 
in the transition.
•  Third, such bold interventions would convince a fragmented and 
disoriented public that the world community is seriously committed 
to sustained peace and reconstruction. Without such a concrete and 
resilient cue from the international community, a vulnerable public 
would have little reason to expose itself to the risk of confronting 
leaders who have a poor civic record.
•  Fourth, skilled Somalis inside the country and in the diaspora must 
rise to the challenge of the transition if they get an opportunity to 
use their talents to rebuild the country. These groups are likely to 
enthusiastically respond to the call if the international community 
strategically involves them in rebuilding public institutions.
•  Finally, Somalis of goodwill will rally behind the transition if the 
promised aid to the country is used to support local entrepreneurs 
and NGOs, and to nurture local ownership of the transition. On 
the contrary, Somalis will not actively endorse the new dispensa-
tion if foreign consultants and international NGOs dominate the 
reconstruction. Many have learned sharply negative lessons in these 
years of political wilderness characterized by demeaning manipula-
tions by external hands.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Somali people, particu-
larly the civic and professional elements, have been hostages in their 
own home. Since the withdrawal of the U.S. and U.N. troops from the 
country in 1995, the world community has told Somalis that assistance 
will flow in only after they have freed themselves. The irony is that the 
international community, in taking this stance, guaranteed the para-
mountcy of the warlords. It would seem that the IGAD strategy, sup-
ported by the international community, prioritized brokering a deal 
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between the merchants of violence and clanism. The outcome of the 
selection process indicates that, at best, only partial power-sharing has 
been achieved. Consequently, peace can only be sustainable and recon-
ciliation feasible if and only if a significant proportion of the population 
is convinced that the transition will progressively lead to a complete 
restoration of citizens’ rights. It is unlikely that the emergent leaders 
would, on their own initiative, put into place and monitor a process of 
democratization that would steadily empower the country’s citizens. 
Such a possibility is clouded by the wrongful and undemocratic meth-
ods employed to select members of key organs of the anticipated state. 
The only recipe that has the prospect of transforming tyranny and 
chaos into an evolving democracy in Somalia is if the leaders of the 
regime solemnly accept the principles of the social contract and if that 
is resolutely backed by the international community.
The new dispensation has two major assets that could be produc-
tive if intelligently utilized. First, most of the public has learned to 
fend for itself, albeit at a low level of subsistence, without state sup-
port during the last two decades. Such existential self-reliance could 
mean that a talented and committed state leadership could chart a new 
public-private partnership, instead of the state dominating the recon-
struction process. This strategy will have the advantage of tapping into 
entrepreneurial and survival skills Somalis have honed over the last 
twenty years, as well as attract professionals whose major concern is to 
effectively rebuild their country. To assemble this project will require a 
mature and ambitious leadership—one that is not afraid to single out 
talent and the nation’s best and brightest to serve. Second, the Somali 
people seem eager to leave behind the horror of the last twenty years. 
They would support the new order if it can deliver peace and justice. 
The glaring conundrum is whether the current crop of MPs and gov-
ernment leaders are credible and astute enough to capitalize on this 
occasion and commence the journey of rebirth.
IV. A Recapitulation
Confidence building is vital and the principles sketched above are crit-
ical to generate trust. A public admission by the new leaders of their 
past serious wrongs and an appeal for forgiveness alone can provide 
a minimum basis for initiating the people’s faith in the transition. The 
second major initiative that would boost public confidence is for the 
Transitional President to courageously acknowledge that he does not 
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have the credibility to deal with the Northwest (Somaliland) due to his 
past violent intervention in the Sool and Sanaag regions, and his clanist 
rantings. Consequently, a high-powered African Commission (outside 
IGAD) should be set up to mediate this potentially catastrophic dif-
ficulty. Third, the new regime should commit itself to a legally bind-
ing contract that will ensure transparency, freedom of expression, real 
democratization, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Fourth, the 
international community’s attentive and effective engagement with 
reconstruction is indispensable.
A recent survey (October 2004) of African citizens unequivocally 
illustrated that the regimes in the continent have been a heartbreaking 
disappointment.9 Similarly, the partisan role of IGAD and its bane-
ful mismanagement of the Somali conference exposes again the bank-
ruptcy of national and regional elites. IGAD’s legacy will be a dark 
one—too fraudulent and inept to have a meaningful role in regional 
affairs. Simultaneously, the leaders of the new Somali dispensation 
must realize that the era when dictatorial and deceitful leaders could 
intimidate or hoodwink the public is over. The nation’s as well as the 
leaders’ only salvation is for the latter to repent, reject being vassals of 
another state, and lead ethically and ably.10 The alternative is the per-
petuation (for all of us) of the curse of political squalor, mutual preda-
tion, international contempt, and abuse.
V. Update
Eight months have elapsed since we authored this brief essay and suf-
ficient evidence has accumulated to warrant a provisional assessment of 
events since last October. We think all the six conditions—which could 
have provided a basis for a new social contract and, subsequently, 
inject kinetic energy that boosts public optimism about the transition 
and the TFG leaders—are yet to gain the attention of the leadership. 
The two exceptions here might be the Speaker of the Parliament, Shar-
iff Hassan Sh. Aden, and a significant number of MPs, who insist on 
the importance of peaceful reconciliation and who have pushed for 
Mogadishu’s demilitarization and the deployment of an African force 
(excluding Ethiopia). In contrast, the President and his allies remain 
adamant about several key issues:
•  He insists on the inclusion of Ethiopian troops in the AU security 
force. This posture flies in the face of the strong feelings of the 
majority of Somalis. The reasons behind such a disapproval include 
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the known fact that Ethiopia is President Yusuf’s external patron 
and, for some even more bitter to swallow, the history of Ethiopia’s 
treatment of Somali people in what used to be called the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia.
•  He and his Prime Minister have created a cabinet that is bewilder-
ingly expansive and bereft of proven records of competence.
•  He has acted unconstitutionally by trying to usurp the duties of the 
Speaker of the Parliament.
•  He considers members of the Cabinet to be “false” ministers—in his 
own language, Wasiiro beenbeena—without realizing that he is their 
leader.
•  His public and private utterances have been contradictory and laced 
with bellicose verbiage and clanistic intimations.
•  He has declared his intention to use his militias to invade Mogadi-
shu and forcefully disarm his competitors.
•  Neither President Yusuf nor Prime Minister Geedi have addressed 
the Somali public or offer an inclusive roadmap to peace and the 
vital role the citizenry can play in reconciliation and reconstruction.
•  The President’s senior staff and companions are mostly either kin-
folk or toadies; he has not seen fit to tap Somali talent from within 
the country or the vast diaspora.
It appears, then, that the President has yet to appreciate the full 
meaning of reconciliation, peace, and accountability. On the contrary, 
many of his words and deeds reiterate his modus operandi in earlier 
years and, therefore, indicate that he might not be willing or, worse, 
capable of graduating from the status of being the warlord of a region 
to the legitimate president of the whole nation. Warlordism connotes 
unvarnished egotism, cruelty and suffering—in short, despotism; the 
latter’s matrix includes temperance, moderation, reason, and legality 
in the carrying out of public duties. Situationally, then, this Somali 
moment seems to be ripe for a leadership that can display gestures and 
actions that are a convincing prefiguration of the ascent, at last, of con-
scientious national spirit, programmatic purposefulness, and correla-
tive skills. In his last work of profound meditation on the question of 
governance in Africa, Claude Ake had taught that an effective manage-
ment of the state, let alone its more daunting creation from the ashes of 
civil strife, requires a particular approach:
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To tame and democratize it, the state has to be seen as something that 
belongs to all and not to some, something which deserves support 
for the service it renders, not as a fearsome exploiter or an exploitable 
resource.11
This alarming record is aggravated by three other actors who have 
failed to meet their obligations. First, Mogadishu-based warlords, who 
are members of the Transitional Federal Government, have made only 
timid attempts to evacuate some of their militias from the capital as 
a result of both pressures brought to bear by the peace movement 
and their own calculations to eliminate what they construe to be the 
President’s excuse for wanting to relocate the seat of the Government 
to Baidoa and Jowhar—two locations where he feels more confident 
about the acquiescence of the warlords who control them. Although 
the encampment of some of the militias in known places outside of 
Mogadishu is a step in the right direction towards minimizing an 
explosive encounter, it is insufficient to assuage what might be legiti-
mate anxieties of the President as well as secure the city for the FTG. 
More sinisterly, it may very well be the cunning hope of the Mogadishu 
warlords that such a tactic will undermine the President’s claim that he 
needs regional troops to pacify the capital. Second, the African Union 
lacks the financial wherewithal to mobilize the peacekeeping force it 
promised to deploy in Mogadishu in order to protect the Government. 
Third, the international community, particularly the European Union 
that sustained the Somali Conference in Kenya, has been ineffectual to 
expedite material support for the AU force. The combination of these 
internal and external factors has reduced the probability that peace 
will be restored to this land. Depressingly, as of this writing, there 
seems to be no forthcoming attempt from the AU or the larger interna-
tional community to identify the danger and act promptly to break the 
logjam.
In contrast to the aforementioned deficits, the Speaker of the Par-
liament has moved to Mogadishu, as designated by the Charter, and 
linked up with the civic and the peace movements in the city. The 
two have jointly striven to push forward the process of taming the 
capital by swaying the warlords to remove their militias from the city. 
It is noteworthy that this effort is being led by women, who are sacri-
ficing their meager resources to feed the cantoned militias. Needless 
to say, they cannot sustain that endeavor for too long without major 
assistance. It seems, therefore, that the international community, which 
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ceded to IGAD the mediative authority (one that in its practical terms 
marginalized Somali civic-minded individuals and associations at the 
Conference), has now adopted a skeptical attitude towards the Moga-
dishu-based peace movement. Such a stance at once deflates the confi-
dence of the civic coalitions and emboldens the warlords-cum-leaders.
Recent declarations by President Yusuf that he is intent on mobiliz-
ing his militias to move towards Mogadishu, and the warlords’ at best 
diffident efforts to locate their armed sectarian groups in common 
camps outside of the capital, suggest that the peace process is virtually 
dead without major and quick international intervention. The misman-
agement of the peace process in Kenya and its corrupt product have 
now created conditions that might rekindle the civil war with annihila-
tive consequences. It is bewildering, then, that the AU, IGAD, and the 
international community, which publicly claim to support Somalia’s 
peaceful reconstruction, are loathe to give a timely and effective hand 
to the peace warriors or, perhaps at the same time, impose diplomatic 
and material sanctions on those who are eager to continue the reign 
of chaos and violence. Having declined to use their immense clout to 
advance real peace, members of the international community should be 
prepared for another tidal wave of Somali refugees. We urge President 
Yusuf, Prime Minister Geedi, and Speaker Sheriff Hassan Sh. Aden to 
strictly adhere to the Charter that prescribes the specific authority of 
their respective offices. Without such a degree of fidelity to the letter 
and spirit of the Charter, a reversion to the malignant mentalité of the 
past decade and more is unavoidable. Furthermore, for all three in 
particular and the rest of the leading edge of the transition in general, 
we alert them to the context that requires a re-moralization of politics 
in which ambition is transvalued from vice to virtue. Such a perspec-
tive will mean the embrace of dialogical and consensual engagement 
as the method of settling contentious issues and of mobilizing the 
vast majority for an ennobling and productive transition. Below, we 
reproduce the articles of the Transitional Federal Charter that stipulate 
the responsibilities of each of the three offices. Finally, we conclude by 
reminding everyone of some of the basic principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the irreducible basis for even a healthy 
pre-modern gemeinschaft, let alone a mature governance fit for the 21st 
century. Here, the wisdom of Cicero is worth recalling:
But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there 
is no social relation among them all more close, none more dear than 
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that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear 
are children, relatives, friends; but one’s native land embraces all our 
loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his 
death he could render her service? So much execrable are those monsters 
who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and 
who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction.12
I. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDENT (Article 44)13
•  Address the opening of the Parliament;
•  Address a special sitting of Parliament once a year;
•  May address Parliament any other time;
•  The President shall nominate the President of the Supreme Court 
and other Judicial Officers on the proposal of the Council of Minis-
ters;
•  The President shall appoint persons to offices in the public service 
and heads of government organs on the proposal of the Council of 
Ministers;
•  The President shall appoint persons to be Ambassadors, Diplomatic 
or Consular representatives to foreign countries on the proposal of 
the Council of Ministers;
•  The President shall receive foreign diplomatic or consular represen-
tatives in the country;
•  The President shall confer state honours on the proposal of the 
Council of Ministers;
•  The President shall appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and/or 
dismiss the government if it fails to obtain the required vote of con-
fidence from Parliament;
•  The President shall dismiss ministers and assistant ministers on the 
proposal of the Prime Minister;
•  The President shall have authority to sign international treaties on 
the proposal of the Council of Ministers and upon ratification by 
Parliament;
•  The President shall assent and sign into law legislation passed by 
the Parliament and regulations and decrees approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
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II. THE PRIME MINISTER (Articles 45 and 48).
•  The executive power shall be vested in the Council of Ministers;
•  The Prime Minister shall propose to the President names of persons 
to be appointed ministers and assistant ministers;
•  The Prime Minister shall propose to the President names of persons 
eligible to be appointed as ministers and assistant ministers irre-
spective of whether he or she is a member of Parliament;
•  The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of 
Ministers;
•  The Prime Minister shall be responsible for the promotion, co-ordi-
nation and supervision of government policy and general adminis-
tration.
III. THE PARLIAMENT AND THE SPEAKER 
(Articles 28, 33, 36, and 38)
•  The legislative powers of the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia shall be vested in Parliament;
•  The members of the Parliament shall represent the unity of the 
nation;
•  Parliament shall elect the President of the TFG;
•  Parliament shall elect Speaker and Deputy Speaker;
•  Parliament shall make legislation;
•  Parliament shall approve and adopt the annual budget;
•  Parliament shall consider motions of confidence in the Govern-
ment;
•  Parliament shall make internal parliamentary regulations;
•  Parliament shall investigate any matter of public interest;
•  Parliament shall hold public hearings;
•  Parliament shall ratify international agreements and treaties;
•  Parliament shall present to the President for assent any law it 
passes;
•  Every Parliamentary sitting shall be presided over by the Speaker.
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IV. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, 
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping 
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and educa-
tion to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progres-
sive measures, national and international, to secure their universal 
and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under 
their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which 
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing 
or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection 
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against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.
Notes
1. See Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., The African State: Reconsiderations 
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2002).
2. Kenya, the other significant actor, behaved with greater restraint and sensitivity. How-
ever, a major blemish on the latter’s dealings was a disappointing proclivity towards 
administrative ineptitude on the part of its chief representative and the coordinator of 
the Conference.
3. It is reported that some of the presidential candidates paid as much as $3,000 per MP 
vote. The great irony is that some of the candidates’ agents took cash and the Quran to 
potential vote sellers. The seller, then, was sworn to cast his/her vote for the candidate 
who paid for the vote. Impartial witnesses reported that money was “King.” A brutally 
honest MP stated, “if money had a father today, he would have wept due to the ease with 
which it was squandered.” This suggests that swearing on the Quran for these MPs had 
no sacred meaning. In this context, what possible value would the swearing in of the 
new president have for upright citizens?
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